Abstract-Dynamic k-times anonymous authentication (k-TAA) schemes allow members of a group to be authenticated anonymously by application providers for a bounded number of times, where application providers can independently and dynamically grant or revoke access right to members in their own group. In this paper, we construct a dynamic k-TAA scheme with space and time complexities of O(log(k)) and a variant, in which the authentication protocol only requires constant time and space complexities at the cost of O(k)-sized public key. We also describe some tradeoff issues between different system characteristics. We detail all the zero-knowledge proofof-knowledge protocols involved and show that our construction is secure in the random oracle model under the q-strong DiffieHellman assumption and q-decisional Diffie-Hellman inversion assumption. We provide a proof-of-concept implementation, experiment on its performance, and show that our scheme is practical.
I. Introduction
A NONYMOUS authentication allows users to show their membership of a particular group without revealing their exact identities. Teranishi et al. [2] proposed a k-times anonymous authentication (k-TAA) scheme (TFS04) so that users of a group can access applications anonymously, while application providers (APs) can decide the number of times users can access their applications. To do so, users first register to the group manager (GM) and each AP announces independently the allowable number of accesses to its applications. A registered user can then authenticate himself to the APs anonymously up to the allowed number of times. Anyone can trace a dishonest user who tries to access an application for more than the allowable number of times.
For higher flexibility, APs may wish to select their own group of users. However, there is no control over who can access which applications in k-TAA. In dynamic k-TAA, proposed by Nguyen and Safavi-Naini [3] (NS05), the role of APs is more active and they can select their user groups, granting and revoking access of registered users independently.
Previous k-TAA schemes, such as TSF04 and NS05, are quite efficient in the sense that both time and space complexities are independent of the total number of users. However, the size of AP's public key and the communication cost between users and APs are both O(k). The computational cost of the user for an authentication protocol is also O(k).
A. Our Contributions
In this paper, we construct a dynamic k-TAA scheme with complexity of O(log(k)). Then, we propose a variant of our scheme with cost O(1) at the cost of O(k)-sized public key. The security of our scheme is proven in the random oracle model under the q-strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) assumption and q-decisional Diffie-Hellman inversion assumption.
Our construction requires a signature scheme with efficient protocols, such as CL signature [4] , which is widely used in various kinds of privacy-preserving protocols such as [5] . It was suggested that a short group signature scheme, proposed by Boneh et al. [6] , can be modified as a q-SDH variant of CL signature, but only an outline is given [7] . We supply the details of the modification with the protocols, and get a new signature scheme that we call BBS+ signature. We prove that BBS+ signature is strongly unforgeable in the standard model under the q-SDH assumption. In addition, our protocol of showing possession of A achieves perfect zero knowledge, while the original protocol [7] is only computational due to the identity-escrow feature. This BBS+ signature is a building block that can be employed in other settings and may be of independent interest.
Compared with the conference version [1] , we brought in the help of an additional author and made the following additional contributions in particular. First, we gave the details of all zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge (ZKPoK) used in our system. BBS+ and the ZKPoK that we built has been adopted as a building block for a range of applications. With these details, we can provide a formal proof of security of our system, which was not available before. Finally, we provide a sample implementation of our construction and experiment on its performance. The result confirms our theoretical complexities analysis that our protocol is practical.
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B. Subsequent Work
The BBS+ signature described in this paper has been used in various subsequent works on anonymous authentication systems and privacy-enhancing technologies. For example, [8] - [17] . BBS signature [6] has also been extended or modified in other work. For example, Yang et al. [13] proposed a re-randomizable (which cannot be strongly unforgeable by definition) variant.
Some of the conceptual building blocks used by our scheme have also been improved or generalized. For example, Camenisch et al. [18] generalized the signature-based range proof used by our system. Acar et al. [19] improved the accumulator used by our system. Another pairing-based accumulator was proposed in [20] . ZKPoK used by our systems are all instantiated by using Fiat-Shamir heuristics. A common-reference string approach of ZKPoK for pairing-product equations was proposed by Groth and Sahai [21] , which provides stronger formal security guarantee at the cost of run-time performance.
Some design principles used in our system have also influenced the design of other kinds of anonymous authentication systems, such as the notion of real traceable signature [11] . This notion was put forth by Chow [11] which gives an efficient cryptographic building block for various applications, namely, transforming an anonymous system to one with fair privacy, a mix-net application where originators of messages can be opened, and open-bid auctions [22] . The mechanism for tracing the signatures of malicious users is very efficient.
C. Related Work
Teranishi and Sako [23] (TS06) proposed a k-TAA scheme with constant proving cost. Our construction can be seen as an extension of TS06 to dynamic k-TAA, in which AP can control their access group dynamically. This is achieved by the use of dynamic accumulator [3] , [24] . Instead of pseudorandom function (PRF), TS06 uses a weakened version that they termed as partial pseudorandom function (PPRF). Nevertheless, our choice of PRF is more efficient than their PPRF.
As pointed out in the literature [23] , k-TAA schemes share certain similarities with compact e-cash schemes [25] . In the latter, a user can only spend (see authenticate) up to k times to all shops (see application providers) combined; while for k-TAA, each application provider may choose its own allowable number of accesses, and the number of accesses to different applications by a user are not related. For instance, a user could authenticate himself n 1 times to one AP and n 2 times to another AP, provided that n 1 and n 2 are less than the limit imposed by the respective AP. Despite these differences, similar techniques can be used to build k-TAA and compact e-cash.
One may view identity-based ring signatures as group signatures with no anonymity management mechanism by treating the key generation center as the GM. However, many schemes (e.g., [26] ) produce signature of size linear in the number of group members, although the verification procedure may be efficient. Some schemes (e.g., [27] ) do feature constant-size signature sizes, perhaps with a higher verification cost. A class of ring signature comes with an additional linkability property, which can be seen as a kind of anonymity management mechanism. However, the standard notion of linkable identity-based ring signatures just leads to two-times anonymous authentication.
Another closely related notion is event-oriented k-times revocable-iff-linked group signatures (k-RiffLGS), introduced by Au et al. [28] . k-RiffLGS is a group signature scheme such that every user can sign on behalf of the group anonymously for up to k times per event, represented by a bit string. No one, not even the GM, can revoke the identity of the signer. Signatures of the same user for different events cannot be linked. If the user signs for more than k times for any event, his identity can be revoked by everyone. Thus, every legitimate user can sign on behalf of the group for up to k times per event and there is no limit to the number of events. In fact, k-RiffLGS can be viewed as a noninteractive version of k-TAA [28] . On the other hand, dynamic k-TAA can be viewed as an interactive version of k-RiffLGS with revocation.
Other signature schemes with efficient protocol, such as CL signature [4] and CL+ signature [7] , could also be used for our construction. BBS+ is good in our case for two reasons.
1) Signature size of BBS+ is shorter than CL or CL+ signature for multiblock messages. Specifically, signature size of CL+ is linear to number of message blocks to be signed; while CL and BBS+ are constant size, of length 1346 and 511 bits, respectively, for security comparable to 1024-bit standard RSA signature.
2) The accumulator we will use is secure based on the same assumption for which security of BBS+ signature also relies on. On the other hand, the security of CL signature and CL+ signature is based on strong RSA assumption and LRSW assumption, respectively.
D. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries are presented in Section II. The framework and the security notions of dynamic k-TAA are reviewed in Section III. We present our construction in Section IV, followed by its variants in Section V. We analyze the security and complexity of our systems in Sections VII and VIII. Details of our sample implementation and efficiency analysis are given in Section IX. We conclude our paper and discuss future research directions in Section X.
II. Preliminaries

A. Bilinear Pairing
We review the notion of bilinear pairing here. A mappinĝ e : G 1 × G 2 → G T is a bilinear pairing if: 1) G 1 and G 2 are cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p; 2) g, h are generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively; 3) ψ :
5) (nondegenerate)ê(g, h) = 1; 6) (unique representation) each element of G 1 , G 2 , and G T has unique binary representation. G 1 and G 2 can be the same group or different groups. We say that two groups (G 1 , G 2 ) are a bilinear group pair if the group action in G 1 , G 2 , the isomorphism ψ and the bilinear mappingê are all efficiently computable.
B. Mathematical Assumptions
Definition 1 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman): The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem in G = g is defined as follows. On input a quadruple (g, g a , g b , g c ) ∈ G 4 , output 1 if c = ab and 0 otherwise. We say that the DDH assumption holds in G if no PPT algorithm has nonnegligible advantage over random guessing in solving the DDH problem in G.
Definition 2 (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman):
The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) problem in a bilinear group pair (G 1 , G 2 ) with trace map ψ is defined as follows. On input
such that there exists a trace map ψ from G 2 to G 1 with g = ψ(h), output a pair (B, e) such that B (γ+e) = g where e ∈ Z * p . We say that the q-SDH assumption holds in (G 1 , G 2 ) if no PPT algorithm has nonnegligible advantage in solving the q-SDH problem in (G 1 , G 2 ).
The q-SDH assumption is shown to be true in the generic group model [29] even when (G 1 , G 2 ) is a bilinear group pair with trace map.
Definition 3 (q-Decisional Diffie-Hellman Inversion):
The q-decisional Diffie-Hellman inversion problem (q-DDHI) in the prime order group G = g is defined as follows. On input
, output 1 if c = 1/x and 0 otherwise. We say that the q-DDHI assumption holds in G if no PPT algorithm has nonnegligible advantage over random guessing in solving the q-DDHI problem in G.
C. Building Blocks
1)
Signature Scheme: A signature scheme is a basic cryptographic primitive for message authentication. There are various security notions for unforgeability of signatures. A weak notion is that the set of messages to be signed is known in advance, even before the generation of the public key. A scheme that is existentially unforgeable under this setting is called weakly secure. On the other hand, strong unforgeability guarantees that it is difficult to come up with a new signature on a message m even if the adversary can adaptively get many signatures on the messages he wants, including one on m. In a variant of our dynamic k-TAA scheme with constant proving effort, we employed a design [23] that is based on the weakly secure short signature by Boneh and Boyen [29] . For the BBS+ signature we are going to describe, we will show that it is strongly unforgeable. We use the notation Sig(m) to denote a signature on the message m.
2) Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge: In zeroknowledge proof of knowledge [30] , a prover proves to a verifier that a statement is true without revealing anything other than the veracity of the statement. Our construction involves statements related to knowledge of discrete logarithms constructed over a cyclic group G of prime order p. These proofs can also be done noninteractively by incorporating the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [31] . The noninteractive counterpart is referred to as signature proof of knowledge, or SPK for short. They are secure in the random oracle model. Following the notation introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [32] , PoK{(x) : y = g x } denotes a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol between a prover and a verifier such that the prover knows some x ∈ Z p where y = g x ∈ G. The corresponding noninteractive signature proof of knowledge on a message m shall be denoted as SPK{(x) : y = g x }(m). One can view this as a signature on the message m signed by a discretelogarithm-based key pair (g x , x). 3) Signature With Efficient Protocols: In this paper, a signature scheme with efficient protocols refers to a signature scheme with two protocols: 1) a protocol between a signature requester and a signer in which the requester obtains a signature on (m 1 , . . . , m L ) from the signer while the signer only gets a commitment of a multiblock message (m 1 , . . . , m L ) but learns nothing about all these messages, and 2) a protocol for the proof of the knowledge of a signature with respect to some multiblock message without revealing any information about the signature nor the messages. For a signature scheme with efficient protocols, the security notion allows the adversary to get signatures through the signature directly (by supplying the messages in clear and obtaining only the final output of the protocol) or via the generation protocol (for details, see [4] ). In our construction, we employed BBS+ signature to be described. 4) Pseudorandom Function: Another building block of our construction is a PRF with efficient proof of correctness of its output. We employed a particular construction of PRF due to Dodis and Yampolskiy [33] (DY-PRF). DY-PRF is defined by a tuple (G p , p, g, s) , where G p = g is a cyclic group of prime order p and s is an element in Z p . On input x, PRF g,s (x) is defined as PRF g,s (x) : x → g 1 s+x+1 . Efficient proof for correctly formed output (with respect to s and x in some commitments such as Pedersen commitment [34] ) exists and the output of PRF g,s is indistinguishable from random elements in G p , provided that the q-DDHI assumption holds [25] . 5) Accumulator: The dynamic feature of our construction is built from the dynamic accumulator with one-way domain due to Nguyen [35] (N-Acc). Roughly speaking, an accumulator is an algorithm that combines a large set of values {x i } into a short accumulator V . For each value x j ∈ {x i }, there exists a witness w j that can prove x is indeed accumulated in accumulator V . An accumulator is dynamic if it allows values to be added or deleted dynamically. SPK of a witness is also described [35] . N-Acc is a secure dynamic accumulator under the q-SDH assumption [35] .
III. Framework
A. Syntax
We review the model of dynamic k-TAA [3] . A dynamic k-times anonymous authentication involves three kinds of entities, namely, group manager (GM), application providers (AP j ), and users (U i ). It consists of seven polynomial time algorithms or protocols (GMSetup, Join, APSetup, GrantAccess, RevokeAccess, Authentication, PublicTracing). The following enumerates the syntax. 1) GMSetup: On input a security parameter 1 λ , the algorithm outputs GM secret key gsk and group public key gpk. For simplicity of the framework, we assume the GM is also responsible for the generation of the system parameter, which is included in gpk. All algorithms below have gpk as one of their implicit inputs. 2) Join: This protocol allows a user U i to join the group and obtain a membership public/secret key pair (mpk i , msk i ) from GM. GM also adds U i 's identification and membership public key to the membership public key archive. A user is called a group member if its identification and membership public key is in the membership public key archive. 3) APSetup: An application provider AP j publishes its identity and announces the number of times k j that a user can access its application. The algorithm may also generates the public and private key (apk j , ask j ) of AP j . 4) GrantAccess: Each AP j manages its own access group L j that is initially empty. This procedure allows AP j to add a user U i to its access group L j and thus grant him the permission to use its application. 5) RevokeAccess: It allows AP j to remove a member from his access group L j and stop this group member from accessing his application. 6) Authentication: User U i authenticates himself to an application provider AP j through this protocol. U i is authenticated only if he is in the access group L j and the number of accesses have not exceeded the allowed number k j . AP records the transcripts of authentication in an authentication log. 7) PublicTracing: Anyone can execute this procedure using public information and the authentication log. The outputs are the membership public key of a user U i , GM, or NIL that indicates user U i tries to access more than the allowed number of times, GM cheated, and there is no malicious party in this authentication log, respectively. For correctness, an honest member who is in the access group and has not authenticated himself for more than the allowed number of times, must be authenticated by an honest AP.
B. Security Requirements
We recall security requirements here, for formal definition please refer to [2] and NguyenS05acns.
1) D-Detectability: A subset of colluded users cannot perform the authentication procedure with the same honest application provider for more than the allowed number of times, or they must be detected by the PublicTracing algorithm. 2) D-Anonymity: No collusion of application providers, users and GM can distinguish between authentication executions of two honest group members who are in the access group of that application provider.
3) D-Exculpability: An honest user cannot be proven to have performed the authentication procedure with the same honest AP for more than the allowed number of times. It is also required that the PublicTracing algorithm shall not output GM if the GM is honest even though all application providers and users collude.
IV. Our Construction Our dynamic k-TAA is built from the q-SDH based accumulator due to Nguyen [35] (N-Acc), the PRF due to Dodis and Yampolskiy [33] (DY-PRF) and BBS+ signature described below.
A. Global Common Parameters
Let λ be the security parameter. Let (G 1 , G 2 ) be a bilinear group pair with computable isomorphism ψ as discussed in Section II-A such that G 1 = g , G 2 = h and |g| = |h| = p for some prime p of λ bits. Assume G p = u is a cyclic group of order p such that the DDH assumption holds.
They are required for the construction of the zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge protocols. L is the number of messages in BBS+ signature. In our dynamic k-TAA scheme, L = 2.
The generation of this common parameter can be done by the GM or by a trusted third party.
B. BBS+ Signature
KeyGen: Choose μ ∈ R Z * p and compute Z = h μ . The secret key is μ and the public key is Z.
Signing Multiblock Messages:
On input (m 1 , . . . , m L ) ∈ Z p L , choose e, s ∈ R Z * p . Compute ς = gg s 0 g m 1 1 · · · g m L L 1 e+μ . Signa- ture on (m 1 , . . . , m L ) is (ς, e, s) ∈ (G 1 × Z * p × Z * p ). Signature Verification: To verify a signature (ς, e, s) on a multiblock message (m 1 , . . . , m L ), check ifê(ς, Zh e ) = e(gg s 0 g m 1 1 · · · g m L L , h).
Protocol for Signing Committed Messages:
The protocol is also known as the signature generation protocol. The user first computes a Pedersen commitment on the multiblock message to be signed. That is, the user randomly generates s ∈ R Z * p and computes
. He sends C m to the signer, along with the following proof:
After verifying PoK 0 , the signer chooses s , e ∈ R Z * p , computes ς = gg 
Proof of Knowledge of A Signature on Committed Messages:
We give a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol for showing possession of a message-signature pair. Using any protocol for proving relations amongst components of a discrete-logarithm representation of a group element [36] , it can be used to demonstrate relations among components of the multiblock message signed. Specifically, let
L be a commitment of a multiblock message (m 1 , . . . , m L ) with randomness r, a user who is in possession of a signature (ς, e, s) can conduct the following zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge protocol with any verifier:
Instantiation of PoK 1 is shown in Section VI-A. We would like to remark that our instantiation is different from the one by Boneh and Boyen [6] in which the latter is computational zero-knowledge (under the decision-linear Diffie-Hellman assumption) while ours is perfect zero-knowledge.
Security Analysis: Unforgeability of BBS+ signature is asserted by the following theorem.
Theorem 1: BBS+ signature is strongly unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attack under the q-SDH assumption.
The proof is deferred to Section VII-A.
C. Overview of Our Construction
We give a high-level description of our construction here.
GMSetup and APSetup:
The GM generates the key pair of BBS+ signature. Each AP publishes a bound k together with the public parameters for the accumulator N-Acc and those for the PRF DY-PRF.
Join: To join the group, the user randomly generates x, t ∈ R Z * p . A membership public key is (y = u x , e) while the membership secret key is (x, ς, s, t) such that (ς, e, s) is a BBS+ signature from the GM on message (x, t). We stress that x, t is unknown to the GM due to signature generation protocol of BBS+. The membership public key (y, e) is placed on the membership public key archive.
GrantAccess and RevokeAccess:
To grant access to a user with membership public key (y, e), the AP adds e into his accumulator N-Acc and gives the witness w to the user. To revoke access of the user, AP removes e from the accumulator. For every GrantAccess, RevokeAccess, all users included in the access group of that AP have to update their own witness using the update algorithm from N-Acc.
In the variant of our scheme (to be discussed in the next section), AP only publishes the access group that is a list of es and let users work with the accumulator themselves. Consequently, the interactive GrantAccess or RevokeAccess protocols are not required. The drawback is that users have to perform O(|L|) operations, where |L| is the size of the list, to compute his own witness.
Authentication:
The idea is to have the user to demonstrate to AP j that he is in possession of a BBS+ signature (ς, e, s) from the GM on values (t, x), and that e is inside the accumulator of AP j . To restrict the user from authenticating himself for more than k times, we borrow the idea of double spender revocation in e-cash system. Specifically, let u j = H(AP j ) be some random element of G p for some cryptographic hash function H and n j be the number of times the user has authenticated with AP j . The user computes a value S = PRF u j ,s (n j ). S is called a one-time pass corresponding to that authentication. In our construction, S = u 1/(s+n j +1) j . The user is required to prove that S is correctly formed by demonstrating he is in possession of a BBS+ signature component (ς, e, s) and 0 ≤ n j < k. For any AP, a user can only generate k valid one-time pass.
The user is also required to compute T = u x PRF u j ,t (n j ) R , where R is a random challenge issued by AP j . T is called a tracing tag. Specifically, T = u x (u 1/(t+n j +1) j ) R and the user is required to prove that T is correctly formed. Each authentication is accompanied by a pair of one-time pass and tracing tag.
In case a user attempts to authenticate more than k times, he will have to repeatedly use the one-time pass and will thus be detected. Since the R values are different, the two tracing tags accompanying those authentication attempts shall be different. With different tracing tags, identity of the user who attempts to authenticate more than k times can be computed.
D. Details of Our Construction
GMSetup: The GM randomly selects μ ∈ R Z * p and computes Z = h μ . The GM also manages a membership public key archive that is a list of 3-tuple (U i , y i , e i ). The list is initially empty.
APSetup: AP j publishes his identity (denoted by AP j ) and a number k j that is much smaller than 2 λ . In addition, AP j selects h j ∈ R G 2 , γ j ∈ R Z * p and computes u j = H(AP j ) ∈ G p for some hash function H and Y j = h γ j j ∈ G 2 . The public key and the secret key of AP j are (AP j , k j , h j , u j , Y j ) and γ j , respectively. AP j maintains an authentication log and an access group list L j of 3-tuple. The list is initialized to (⊥, ⊥, ψ(h j )).
Join: User U i obtains his membership public/secret key pair from GM through the following interactive protocol.
2) GM verifies the proof and randomly selects s i ∈ R Z * p . He sends s i to the user. 
GrantAccess: AP
3) The above can be abstracted as SPK 4 whose instantiation is shown in Section VI-D 4 , S, T , R, m) to its authentication log. 5) U i increases its counter, n i,j , by one.
4) AP
PublicTracing: For two entries (SPK, S, T, R) and (SPK , S , T , R ), if S = S , the underlying user of these authentications has not exceed its prescribed usage k j or they are from different user.
If S = S , everyone can compute
and outputs the corresponding U i as the cheating user by looking up for the entry indexed by y i in the membership public key archive. If y i does not exist, it can be concluded that GM has deleted some data from the list and this algorithm outputs GM.
Security Analysis: Regarding the security of our dynamic k-TAA, we have the following theorem whose proof is shown in Section VII-B. Theorem 2: Our scheme possesses D-Detectability, DAnonymity, and D-Exculpability under the k-DDHI assumptions in the random oracle model.
V. Variants of Our Construction
A. Local Witness Update
We propose a variant of our scheme where the APs do not need to interact with the users via GrantAccess and RevokeAccess when the group of users are changed dynamically.
We highlight the changes. In the initialization phase, a common accumulator is initialized for all APs by randomly selecting q ∈ R Z * p and computing q i = h 0 q i for i = 1, . . . , t max , where t max is the maximum number of users in an access group. This procedure can be done by the GM or a trusted third party.
In APSetup, the AP only needs to publish its identity and bound k. It also needs to maintain a list of users' membership public key of users allowed to access its application. Granting access and revoking access simply means that the AP change such a list of users.
Finally, user in the access group have to compute their own witness as follows. A user with membership public key e i first retrieves the list of membership public key {e j } of the AP's access group. If e i ∈ {e j }, the user accumulates the set {e j } into a value v by computing v = h 
B. Key-Size Versus Proving Effort
We can construct dynamic k-TAA with constant proving effort by requiring each AP to publish k signatures Sig(1), . . . , Sig(k) [23] . In the authentication, instead of proving 0 < n ≤ k (which is the only part with complexity O(log k)), the user proves possession of a signature on n (which can be done in O (1)). This indirectly proves that n is within the range. The tradeoff is that public key size of the AP is now linear in k, and users colluding with AP can be untraceable, says the malicious AP can issue Sig(n * ) for some user where n * > k. However, we can trust that the AP would not issue Sig(n) for users because it is against the interest of the AP. The weakly secure short signature from Boneh and Boyen [29] is sufficient for our purpose since the choice of message is fixed (1 to k) . That is, there are a fixed and polynomial number of messages to be signed and the security of weakly secure Boneh-Boyen short signature guarantees that under this condition the scheme is unforgeable. The advantage is that the signature is extremely short, only one single group element. Our implementation employs this approach and details can be found in Section VI-E.
VI. Details of the Zero-Knowledge
Proof 
The prover sends (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 ) to the verifier. 2) (Challenge.) The verifier chooses a random challenge c ∈ R Z * p and sends c to prover. 3) (Response.) The prover computes z r 1 
and 0 otherwise. Regarding PoK 1 , we have the following theorem that is straightforward and the proof is thus omitted.
Theorem 3: PoK 1 is an interactive honest-verifier zeroknowledge proof-of-knowledge protocol with special soundness.
B. Details of PoK 2
PoK 2 can be done using standard proof of the representation of discrete logarithms. 2 ; and 0 otherwise.
D. Details of SPK 4
To conduct SPK 4 , U i computes
to AP j and computes the following two SPKs: 4 , β 5 , β 6 , β 7 , β 8 :
Instantiation of SPK 4B is a simple range proof and is discussed in Section VI-E. 2 , 
= H(m||AP j ||T ) and 0 otherwise. 4 1) Exact Range Proof: Secure and efficient exact proof of range is possible in groups of unknown order under factorization assumption [37] . However, observe that the range proof required in our authentication protocol is always of the form of 0 ≤ n < k. If we set k = 2 κ , a simple range proof of order O(κ) can be constructed easily.
E. Range Proof of SPK
For the ease of presentation, we let C n = g n 0 g r 1 be a commitment of n and the goal is the following zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge:
We show the noninteractive version here for two reasons. First, it is more space-efficient. Second, it is compatible with our protocol in which the noninteractive version (signature of knowledge) is used.
The prover does the following. Let n[ ] be the th bit of n such that starts from 0. For = 0 to κ − 1, compute
Conduct the following two SPKs:
We describe SPK 5A first, which can be done using standard proof of representation of discrete logarithms together with equality of discrete logarithms.
1) (Commitment.) The prover randomly generates ρ n , ρ r , ρ α ∈ R G p and computes
2) (Challenge.) The prover computes challenge c = H(m||T) using a cryptographic hash function H. and
2 . Set T = (T ,0 , T ,1 ). Output 1 if c ,0 + c ,1 = H(m||T ) for all = 0 to κ − 1 and 0 otherwise. The two SPKs consists of (4κ + 4) elements in Z p , and κ C s in G 1 . In our protocol, total size of the range proof is (4 + 4κ) * 170 + κ * 171 bits.
2) Signature-Based Range Proof: The idea has been described in Section V. While not exactly a generic range proof, it suffices for all our purpose. Let ι ∈ Z p be a secret value of an AP, and I = h ι be a public value. Specifically, a weakly secure Boneh-Boyen short signature [29] (g, h) . The AP also publishes
To conduct SPK 5C , the prover first computes A 6 = g
for some randomly generated r 1 , r 2 ∈ R Z * p . 1) (Commitment.) The prover randomly generates ρ r 1 , ρ r 2 ,
. The prover sets T = (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 ). 2) (Challenge.) The prover computes challenge c = H(m||T). 3) (Response.) The prover computes z r 1 
The prover outputs (c, z) as SPK 5C . 5) (Verify.) Upon receiving SPK 5C := (c, z), verifier computes the following:
.
= H(m||T ) and 0 otherwise.
VII. Security Analysis
A. Analysis of BBS+
1)
Capabilities of the Forger: F is allowed to issue two types of signing query, namely, normal signing and signing through the signature generation protocol. F is a successful forger if, after issuing q signature queries in total, it can output q + 1 valid and distinct message-signature pairs.
2) Simulation and Reduction: Assume there exists a forger F that could forge a BBS+ signature under adaptively chosen message attack. Suppose it makes q signature queries. We construct a simulator S that solves the q-SDH problem in a bilinear group pair.
S is given an instance of the q-SDH problem (g , h , h μ , . . . , h μq ) and its goal is to output a pair (A , e ) such that A e + μ = g . This pair satisfiesê(A , h e h μ ) =ê(g , h ). S first randomly chooses, for i = 1 to q − 1, e i ∈ R Z * p and denotes the q − 1 degree polynomial gives (h, Z, g 0 , . . . , g L ) to F as the public key of the BBS+ signature.
F is allowed to issue up to q signature queries. If it is a signing query through the signature generation protocol, S needs to rewind F during execution of PoK 0 to obtain the multiblock message committed. Then, each signing query through the signature generation protocol can be handled in the same way as the normal signing query. Due to the need of rewinding, BBS+ signature generation protocol cannot be run in parallel. Below we only describe how normal signing query is handled.
For the ith query, denote the multiblock message to be signed as (m 1,i , . . . , m 
Since e / ∈ {e i , e * }, (e + μ) does not divide f (μ) (respectively f (μ)(μ + e * )) and S computes a q − 2 (respectively q − 1) degree polynomial Q(μ) (respectively Q * (μ)) and constant Q (respectively Q * ) such that f (μ) = Q(μ)(μ + e ) + Q (respectively f (μ)(μ + e * ) = Q * (μ)(μ + e ) + Q * ). Thus
Thus, (g Since (e * + μ) does not divide f (μ), S computes q − 2 degree polynomial Q(μ) and constant Q such that f (μ) = (e * + μ)Q(μ) + Q. Thus
Thus, (g 1 μ+e , e ) is the solution the to q-SDH problem. If the success probability of F is , then in the worst case, success probability of S is /q. 
B. Analysis of Our k-TAA
Since the protocol is done noninteractively, S is given control over the random oracle in addition to the blackbox access to A. Moreover, such extraction requires rewind simulation and thus the Join protocol cannot be executed concurrently.
For each AP, let u j = H(AP j ) = u r j 0 for some randomly chosen r j . Due to the soundness of the underlying SPK, A f , together with the set {r j } contains all valid one-time pass S that A can produce, except with negligible probability. For A to break D-Detectability, one of the following two happens. 1) A convinces an honest AP to accept a one-time pass S for which it cannot generate an honest proof of validity with some non-negligible probability. 2) A uses duplicated S but public tracing does not output the identity of the user within the f Join protocol. Consider case 1 such that A convinces an honest AP to accept an invalid one-time pass S during the authentication protocol. Then, A must have conducted a false proof as part of the signature of knowledge such that one of the following does not hold.
Item 1 happens with negligible probability under the q-SDH assumption, as violating item 1 implies breaking the unforgeability of the BBS+ signature discussed above. Item 2 happens with negligible probability under the assumption that the accumulator is secure [35] (also relied on q-SDH assumption). Items 3 and 4 happen with negligible probability under the DL assumption (which will be subsumed by the k-DDHI assumption in the theorem). Item 5 happens with negligible probability if the proof-of-knowledge of committed number lies in an exact interval exists. To conclude, the total success probability of A in case 1 is negligible.
Consider case 2, and it has already been proved in case 1 that A cannot have an honest AP to accept an invalid S with non-negligible probability. Since A must use valid one-time pass S, to authenticated more than k times for the same AP, it must uses duplicated S. Let (S, SPK 1 ) and (S, SPK 2 ) be the transcript of authentication for which an honest AP (AP j ) accept a duplicated one-time pass S such that S 1/r j ∈ A f . Since the AP is honest, R 1 = R 2 with high probability. We are to show that
so that identity of the cheater could be recovered from the PublicTracing algorithm.
Since R 1 , R 2 are chosen by the honest AP, this uniquely fixes T 1 , T 2 as the only valid tracing tags to accompany the duplicated one-time pass S in these two authentications. To deviate from these S and T , A must conduct fake proof of validity of the authentication protocol that we already shown to happen with only negligible probability. Thus, PublicTracing outputs the identity of the cheater without overwhelming probability.
During the course of the running of A, it is allowed to query several oracles. We outline how S simulates these oracles. The join oracle is simulated by invoking the signing oracle of the BBS+ signature (S needs to extract the multiblock message from the commitment and this makes the join procedure nonconcurrent). Authentication oracle is simulated by randomly generating s, t, x, n j , backpatching the random oracle and simulating the signature of knowledge of the authentication procedure.
2) D-Anonymity: The adversary A, colluding with the GM and all APs, creates the global system parameters. Finally, A will be asked to engage in a legal number of authentication protocol with some real user j or simulator S.
For each authentication procedure, S simulates as follows. 1) S is given seed and compute R = H(seed).
2) S random chooses s, t, x and a random n j ∈ R {1, . . . , k} and compute S = u
4) The proof of items 3-5 are real while item 1 is handled by the simulator for a proof of knowledge of a BBS+ signature and item 2 is handled by the simulator for a proof of knowledge of the accumulator. We now explain why the output of S is computationally indistinguishable from the output of a real user. The idea is that during the Join protocol A learn nothing about the set of secrets of (s, t, x) of the real user, due to the security of the BBS+ signature. Thus, the values (s, t, x) chosen by S is indistinguishable from those chosen by real users. Due to the security of the PRF [33] , S and T are indistinguishable from randomly elements under the k-DDHI assumption. Thus, A can distinguish a real user and a simulator only if it could distinguish a real proof or a simulated proof of the BBS+ signature, or it could break the security of the PRF. The probability is negligible under k-DDHI assumption.
3) D-Exculpability: D-Exculpability for the GM is quite straightforward to show. Suppose the GM is honest but PublicTracing on input two authentication transcripts (S, R 1 , SPK 1 ), (S, R 2 , SPK 2 ) outputs an entry not exists in the identification list, then someone have been able to fake the proof of knowledge either in the Join protocol or in the authentication protocol, which happen with negligible probability. Proof of D-Exculpability for honest user is also quite straightforward. The proof of knowledge of T in the authentication protocol involve the user secret x. To slander an honest user, adversary without knowledge of user secret x have to fake the knowledge of T that involve knowledge of x to base u 0 . This happens with negligible probability.
VIII. Complexity Analysis
We analyze the efficiency of our system in terms of both time and communication complexities. Both complexities are not dependent on the number of users and APs but on the number of allowable accesses k (in different manner, according to how range proof in authentication is implemented). In the system with constant size public key, both time and communication complexities are logarithmic in k (log(k)). For the variant described in Section V-B, the complexities are constant (O(1)); however, the space complexity of an AP's public key is O(k) (and the time complexity is also O(k)).
In the analysis here, we focus on the variant of our system described in Section V-B since it is more efficient in terms of communication cost. In particular, an authentication protocol consists of a one-time pass S, a tracing tag T , a random challenge m and a proof-of-correctness SPK 4 . Assume m is also an element in Z * p , the total communication cost consists of 2 elements in G p , 7 elements in G 1 and 24 elements in Z p .
For time complexity, we count the number of multiexponentiations (multi-EXPs) in various groups and the number of pairings. Operations such as hashing, element negation or addition are neglected as they take insignificant time compared with multi-EXP or pairing. A multi-EXP computes the product of exponentiations faster than performing the exponentiations separately. For our usage, we assume one multi-EXP operation multiplies up to three exponentiations. In fact, our experimental result confirms that a multi-EXP with 3 different bases is almost as fast as a single exponentiation.
For computation, user is required to compute 16 multiEXPs in G 1 , 2 multi-EXPs in G p , 4 multi-EXPs in G T and 3 pairings. We would like to stress that a large part of the user's work can be precomputed. In fact, out of the above operations, only 2 multi-EXP in G p should be computed online. We shall see in the experiment results that online computation for the user is very efficient.
On the other hand, AP is required to compute 9 multi-EXPs in G 1 , 2 multi-EXPs in G 2 , 2 multi-EXPs in G p , 7 multi-EXPs in G T and 3 pairings. However, they cannot be precomputed, since they are dependent on the choice of the user.
IX. Experimental Results
The test machine is a Dell GX620 with an Intel Pentium-4 3.0 GHz CPU and 2 GB RAM running Windows XP Professional SP2 as the host. We used Sun xVM VirtualBox 2.0.0 to emulate a guest machine of 1 GB RAM running Ubuntu 7.04. Our implementation is written in C and relies on the pairing-based cryptography (PBC) library (version 0.4.18) for the underlying elliptic-curve group and pairing operations.
We chose the type D pairing bundled with the PBC library. Specifically, p is of size 181-bit. An element in Z p , G 1 can be represented by 24 and 25 bytes respectively. As for G p , we have two choices. We could take G p as G 1 if we assume DDH problem is difficult in G 1 . Such a assumption is formally called the external Diffie-Hellman (XDH) assumption, which implies there is no efficient mapping from G 1 to G 2 . On the other hand, we could take G p as G T and in this case no extra assumption is needed. We implemented both solutions. In both cases, experimental results show that 1 pairing operation takes roughly 6 ms on our test machine. A single base exponentiation (respectively, 3-base exponentiation) in G 1 takes 2.32 ms (respectively 2.36 ms).
When we take G p to be G 1 , it takes 89 and 4 ms for the user to complete the offline and online computation respectively. It takes 72 ms for the application provider to complete the protocol. Timing figures are similar when we do not make the XDH assumption. For instance, it takes 93 and 4 ms for the user to complete the offline and online computation respectively. For the application provider, it takes 70 ms to complete the protocol.
The main difference between the two implementations is the bandwidth requirement. With XDH assumption made, the total bandwidth required is 777 bytes; while it becomes 1015 bytes without such an assumption. The reason is that 144 bytes is required to represent an element in G T .
The public key size of the APs is the only quantity that is linear in k in our system, which involves k weakly secure Boneh-Boyen short signature, 25 bytes each. In addition, it takes roughly 3 ms for the AP to generate one such signature. Thus, for moderate k, the public key size of the AP and the parameter generation time, while linear in k, are more acceptable than one may expect.
X. Conclusion and Research Directions
It was suggested that anonymous authentication systems such as k-TAA systems [2] , [3] , [23] are suitable cryptographic primitives for secure applications with privacy concern like e-voting [38] . In this paper, we constructed a constant-size dynamic k-TAA scheme, which solved the open problem left by the Ph.D. thesis of Nguyen [39] . We also provided a proofof-concept implementation and analyzed its efficiency. Finally, BBS+ signature derived as a building block of our system could be useful for other cryptographic systems.
Our dynamic k-TAA system requires constant proving effort but linear-size AP public keys. One technical challenge that remains to be solved is to design a dynamic k-TAA scheme with constant complexities for all parameters.
The dynamic feature of our scheme relies on the use of a dynamic accumulator, but to prove useful relationships between the accumulated value, the signature, and the PRF, and others, we take an accumulator that requires either a secret or a long public parameter (increases linearly with the size of the membership) for the dynamic update. A real dynamic accumulator about which we can prove things, without the need of a secret or a long parameter, will be a useful cryptographic construct.
Our construction was built from specific building blocks. It would be nice to have a generic construction of dynamic k-TAA, perhaps borrowing a generic design of traceable signatures [40] .
Similar to the discussions in the literature [27] , [28] , [27] , authentication schemes can be classified according to their revocability level (unrevocable, revocable-iff-linked, revocable) and anonymity level (fully anonymous, escrowedlinkable [27] , publicly linkable). It is also interesting to identify practical applications for an authentication scheme with a nice level of privacy.
